General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior
This research addresses the assumption that "general deterrence" is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such "signal cases"? (2) Does knowing about "signal cases" change firms' compliance-related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the "signal case", but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance-related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of "explicit general deterrence" knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Thornton, Dorothy ; Gunningham, Neil ; Kagan, Robert A. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Social license and environmental protection : why businesses go beyond compliance
Gunningham, Neil, (2009)
-
Social licence and environmental protection : why businesses go beyond compliance
Gunningham, Neil, (2002)
-
Shades of green : business, regulation, and environment
Gunningham, Neil, (2003)
- More ...