Generalized Binary Constitutions and the Whole Set of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
Arrow’s theorem [1963] states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Pareto principle is necessarily dictatorial in the sense that the social decision on any pair of candidates coincides with the strict preference of a fixed individual, the Arrow’s dictator. When individual preferences are weak orders, no further description is provided on the social outcome as soon as the Arrow’s dictator is indifferent on a pair of candidates. We provide in the present paper another proof of the Arrow’s theorem using generalized binary constitutions. Moreover we completely characterize the set of Arrovian SWFs, those are complete and transitive SWFs that satisfy IIA and the Pareto principle.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | ANDJIGA, Nicolas Gabriel ; MOUYOUWOU, Issofa ; MOULEN, Joël |
Published in: |
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique. - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE). - 2011, 101-102, p. 187-202
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Publisher: |
École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Admnistration Économique (ENSAE) |
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