Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Giraud, Gaël ; Rochon, Céline |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 20.2003, 3, p. 405-428
|
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Theorie | Theory |
-
Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
Giraud, Gaël, (2001)
-
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
Ehlers, Lars, (2007)
-
Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
Boosey, Luke A., (2016)
- More ...
-
Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies
Giraud, Gaël, (2003)
-
Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
Giraud, Gaël, (2002)
-
Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
Giraud, Gaël, (2001)
- More ...