Gentlemen do not talk about money : remuneration dispersion and firm performance relationship on British boards
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zalewska-Mitura, Anna |
Published in: |
Journal of empirical finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0927-5398, ZDB-ID 1158263-7. - Vol. 27.2014, p. 40-57
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Board diversity | Incentive pay | Firm performance | Unternehmenserfolg | Führungskräfte | Managers | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Vorstand | Executive board | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Lohn | Wages | Diversity Management | Diversity management | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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