Geographic concentration of institutions, corporate governance, and firm value
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
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Authors: | Huang, Xiaoran ; Kang, Jun-koo |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 47.2017, p. 191-218
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Subject: | Geographic concentration | Corporate governance | Institutional investors | Shareholder coordination | CEO turnover | Proxy voting | Free-rider problem | Corporate Governance | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor | Regionales Cluster | Regional cluster | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Führungskräfte | Managers | Shareholder Value | Shareholder value | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem |
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