Global Games with Strategic Substitutes
This paper proves an equilibrium selection result for a class of games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a general class of binary action, N-player games, we prove that each such game has a unique equilibrium strategy profile. Using a global game approach first introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), recent selection results apply to games with strategic complementarities. The present paper uses the same approach but removes the assumption of perfect symmetry in the dominance region of the players' payo.s. Instead we assume that players are ordered such that asymmetric dominance regions overlapped sequentially. This allow us to extend selection results to a class of games with strategic substitutes.
Year of publication: |
2003-03-06
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Authors: | Harrison, Rodrigo |
Institutions: | Georgetown University, Department of Economics |
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