Globally strong uninvadable sets of profiles in asymmetric games
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Narang, Aradhana ; Shaiju, A. J. |
Published in: |
International game theory review. - [River Edge], NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0219-1989, ZDB-ID 1500913-0. - Vol. 22.2020, 1, p. 1-8
|
Subject: | Asymmetric evolutionary games | replicator dynamics | games with continuousstrategy space | globally strong uninvadable sets | weak attracting sets | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | Evolutionary game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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