Goal independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Crowe, Christopher |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 24.2008, 4, p. 748-762
|
Subject: | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Theorie | Theory |
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