Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: When Large Stakes Are Not Enough
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín ; Corgnet, Brice ; Hernán González, Roberto |
Institutions: | Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of Business and Economics |
Subject: | Intrinsic motivation | incentives | goal-setting | reference dependent preferences | virtual organizations |
Series: | |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 61 pages |
Classification: | C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction) |
Source: |
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