Going for growth: overeducation in a tax competition game
A model of international tax competition is developed in which taxes are raised in order to finance education which in turn raises income. It is shown that, in contrast to results from the tax competition literature, the outcome of a non-cooperative game can be to raise the tax rate, with the result that investment in education exceeds that which is globally socially optimal. This provides an explanation for the tendency for countries to emphasise growth as an objective in spite of what empirical studies tell us about the impact of income on happiness; it also identifies a new type of overeducation.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Johnes, Geraint |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Management School |
Saved in:
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