Government Leadership and Central Bank Design
Year of publication: |
2002-05
|
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Authors: | Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Weymark, Diana |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | central bank independence | monetary policy delegation | policy coordination | policy game | policy leadership |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 3395 |
Classification: | E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission |
Source: |
-
Government Leadership and Central Bank Design
Hallett, Andrew Hughes, (2002)
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Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks
Hallett, Andrew Hughes, (2002)
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Macroeconomic Policy in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union
Grimm, Oliver, (2007)
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Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, (2002)
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The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, (2002)
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Policy games and the optimal design of central banks
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, (2004)
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