Government lending as a tool to mitigate the effect of asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Park, Sangkyun |
Published in: |
Public finance review : PFR. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1552-7530, ZDB-ID 2070401-X. - Vol. 51.2023, 5, p. 688-715
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Subject: | government credit | asymmetric information | adverse selection | investment efficiency | credit rationing | Theorie | Theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kreditrationierung | Credit rationing | Finanzmarkt | Financial market | Kreditgeschäft | Bank lending | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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