Government Spending and Electoral Volatility in Emergent Democracies : Evidence from East and Southeast Asia

A large literature on government spending notes that new democracies generally change their spending patterns in favor of social spending to build support and in response to constituency demand. Yet, curiously, studies of new democracies also reveal volatility in their party system development as parties split, merge, disband or reemerge. Under such conditions of party volatility, what is the effect of government spending on electoral support for the ruling party? Does government spending lead to a decrease in electoral volatility for the ruling party? The literature offers conflicting expectations: political ambition studies based on mature democracies suggests that it may be so; however, studies also note that party-emergence in emergent democracies is also tied to political ambition to build constituencies under a changeable political landscape. This paper examines government spending and electoral volatility in the emergent democracies of East and Southeast Asia, that is, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. Electoral volatility is defined as the minimum shift in the vote based on aggregate election results. Given the effects of party system volatility on democratic development, this examination of the effects of government spending on electoral volatility represents an essential step towards clarifying where electoral volatility exists, and may explain how the maturation of the ruling parties stabilizes the party system