Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs.
Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers outcomes when government cannot commit. The authors find that welfare can be higher when information is poor, that government should at times commit to continuing a program it believes had failed, and that a government which fears losing power may acquire either too much or too little information. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Glazer, Amihai ; Hassin, Refael |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 94.1998, 1-2, p. 105-15
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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