Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a dynamic, non- cooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the planning horizon of the parties, the discount factor and the growth prospect of the debtor country

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Bac, Mehmet
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Schuldenmanagement \| Debt management \| Kredittilgung \| Loan repayment \| Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060691