Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kuniavsky, Sergey ; Smorodinsky, Rann
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 3, p. 499-503
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Congestion games \| Equilibrium \| Greediness

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729468