Gresham's law in politics: Why are politicians not the most remarkable men for porbity and punctuality?
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Albert, Rocío ; Cabrillo, Francisco |
Published in: |
European journal of law and economics. - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0929-1261, ZDB-ID 1231592-8. - Vol. 21.2006, 2, p. 99-112
|
Subject: | Währungssubstitution | Currency substitution | Politiker | Politicians | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Reputation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Korruption | Corruption | Theorie | Theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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