Group efforts when performance is determined by the "best shot"
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barbieri, Stefano ; Malueg, David A. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 56.2014, 2, p. 333-373
|
Subject: | Best-shot public good | Privately provided public good | Volunteer's dilemma | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Ehrenamtliche Arbeit | Voluntary work | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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