Group Lending with Peer Selection and Moral Hazard

This paper extends Ghatak (1999)'s base model of group lending with asymmetric information by allowing individuals to differ both in their exogenous risk type and in their endogenous effort level. We find that joint liability leads to positive assortative matching in both a non-cooperative and a cooperative game setting. Groups of safe borrowers also exhibit higher effort levels, which further reinforces their likelihood of repayment as opposed to risky groups

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Gan, Li
Other Persons:	Hernandez, Manuel A. (contributor) ; Liu, Yanyan (contributor)
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Soziale Gruppe \| Social group \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Kredit \| Credit \| Mikrofinanzierung \| Microfinance

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 7, 2017 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2998801 [DOI]
Classification:	O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952631