Group reputations, stereotypes, and cooperation in a repeated labor market
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Healy, Paul J. |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 97.2007, 5, p. 1751-1773
|
Subject: | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Matching | Arbeitsmarkt | Labour market | Theorie | Theory |
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