Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game
The effects of group size and cooperativeness of others upon an individual's propensity to cooperate is studied using the Take-Some format of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. By holding utility effects constant, this format permits comparisons to be made between the performances of subjects in different size groups. A 2 × 2 experimental design was employed in which 48 male subjects were assigned to stooge-player groups comprised of either two or eleven “others.†Stooge players in these groups employed either high or low cooperative strategies in 200 repeated trials of play. The results show a significant group-size effect upon the degree of cooperativeness evidenced by the subjects. A significant group size x stooge strategy interaction was also observed, subjects in the 3-person group being responsive to the “others†while subjects in the larger group remained relatively unaffected by “others' â€cooperativeness. An interpretation of these results is made in terms of the “accountability†of an individual to others in the group.
Year of publication: |
1977
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fox, John ; Guyer, Melvin |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 21.1977, 2, p. 323-338
|
Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Equivalence and Stooge Strategies in Zero-Sum Games
Fox, John, (1973)
-
Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Guyer, Melvin, (1973)
-
Hamburger, Henry, (1975)
- More ...