Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bidders.

We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. The buyers have the same ex post valuation of the object but differ in their estimates of what this value is.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Neeman, Z. ; Orosel, G.O.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Boston University
Subject:	INFORMATION \| AUCTIONS \| LEARNING

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Series:	Boston University - Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	31 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669846