Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Figuieres, C. ; Garderes, P. ; Rychen, F.
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	INVESTMENTS \| GAMES

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Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	7 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634410