Hidden information problems in the design of family allowances
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Cigno, Alessandro ; Luporini, Annalisa ; Pettini, Anna |
Published in: |
Journal of population economics. - Heidelberg : Springer, ISSN 0933-1433, ZDB-ID 625005-1. - Vol. 17.2004, 4, p. 645-655
|
Subject: | Familienleistungsausgleich | Family benefits | Optimale Besteuerung | Optimal taxation | Familienökonomik | Family economics | Kinder | Children | Bildungsinvestition | Human capital investment | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory |
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