Hidden overtime : optimal contracts with (self-)deceptive effort reports
Year of publication: |
22 April 2023
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Authors: | Alasalmi, Juho ; Goldlücke, Susanne ; Jordan, Michelle |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | self-signaling | hidden effort | career concerns | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Karriereplanung | Career development | Überbeschäftigung | Overemployment | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP18105 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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