Hiding Information in Electoral Competition
Year of publication: |
2002
|
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Authors: | Heidhues, Paul ; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Wahlkampf | Electoral campaign | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Signalling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Games and Economic Behavior Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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