Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction
We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad to avoid computational complexity [Rothkopf, M., Pekec, A., Harstad, R., 1998, Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Manage. Sci. 44, 1131-1147]. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these "wind tunnel" tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in a segment of the upcoming 700 MHz auction.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Goeree, Jacob K. ; Holt, Charles A. |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 70.2010, 1, p. 146-169
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | FCC spectrum auctions Package bidding Experiments |
Saved in:
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