Hobbes to rousseau: Inequality, institutions and development
This article studies the endogenous evolution of economic and political institutions and the interdependencies with the process of economic development. Favourable economic institutions in the form of a state of law and absence of societal conflict arise in equilibrium. Democracies are neither necessary nor sufficient to implement a state of law, even if they may be instrumental. Efficient oligarchies can emerge and persist supported by the consensus of all groups. A taxonomy of politico-economic equilibria shows the endogenous evolution of institutions depending on economic inequality and natural resource abundance, implying a non-monotonic relationship between inequality and institutional quality.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Cervellati, Matteo ; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe ; Sunde, Uwe |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
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