Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kiyotaki, Fumi |
Published in: |
Research in economics : an international review of economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1090-9443, ZDB-ID 1379004-3. - Vol. 64.2010, 1, p. 36-44
|
Subject: | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Anforderungsprofil | Occupational profile | Bildungsinvestition | Human capital investment | Theorie | Theory |
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