Hold-Up Problems in International Electricity Trade

This paper investigates the impact of limited commitment on international electricity trade. We build a model where hold-up problems originating from incomplete contracts decrease countries' willingness to trade. In particular, an inability to commit to future trade reduces the specialization of investment. The paper then uses the model to explore potential policy solutions including deregulation and the liberalization of ownership

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Wren-Lewis, Liam
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Elektrizitätswirtschaft \| Electric power industry \| Theorie \| Theory \| Welt \| World \| Sunk Costs \| Sunk costs

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (37 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 1, 2013 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2654312 [DOI]
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; F19 - Trade. Other ; L94 - Electric Utilities ; O18 - Regional, Urban, and Rural Analyses
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016492