Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in How Institutional Investors Perceive Corporate and Securities Regulations

We use an in-depth survey of institutional investors investing in Japan to reveal the homogeneity and heterogeneity of their views on corporate governance regulations. Their opinions exhibited high homogeneity in favoring legislative intervention in corporate management but nuanced heterogeneity with respect to the degree of intervention that they regarded as desirable. A certain cluster of investors, to which investment trusts and advisors were more likely to belong, tended to prefer stronger legal intervention; these investors favored strict tender-offer rules, and they more clearly supported intervention in the composition of boards and the pursuit of executive liability. These reactions may have been motivated by concern for the fact that a certain class of shareholders, particularly banks and insurance companies, was vulnerable to pressure by management, making it hard for corporations functioning autonomously to maximize shareholder values. The survey results suggest that shareholder composition may affect the necessity and effectiveness of legal interventions