Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions. <p>We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Koshevoy, Gleb
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1997, 2, p. 295-302
Publisher:	Springer

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369480