Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Henke, Alexander ; Khalil, Fahad ; Lawarrée, Jacques |
Published in: |
Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS. - Boston, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1530-9134, ZDB-ID 1481233-2. - Vol. 31.2022, 3, p. 762-783
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Korruption | Corruption | Erpressung | Extortion | Theorie | Theory |
-
Corruption in procurement : the economics of regulatory blackmail
Mogiljanski, Ariane, (1994)
-
Corruption in procurement : the economics of regulatory blackmail
Mogiljanski, Ariane, (1994)
-
How to deal with unprofitable customers? : a salesforce compensation perspective
Banerjee, Sumitro, (2013)
- More ...
-
Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
Khalil, Fahad, (2013)
-
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
Khalil, Fahad, (2013)
-
Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
Khalil, Fahad, (2007)
- More ...