Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy.
The welfare implications of horizontal mergers are examined in the context of the Cournot-Nash model of M. Perry and R. Porter (1985). Horizontal mergers are more likely to be welfare enhancing the more concentrated is the ownership of the nonmerging firms. Mergers that create a new largest firm, or increase the size of the largest firm, reduce welfare. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | McAfee, R Preston ; Williams, Michael A |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 40.1992, 2, p. 181-87
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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