Horizontal mergers for buyer power

Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.

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Year of publication:	2008-01-18
Authors:	Fauli-Oller, Ramon ; Bru, Lluis
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2008, 3, p. 1-7
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L0 - Industrial Organization. General ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630137