How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller's optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Hu, Audrey
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 113.2011, 1, p. 29-31
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Bidder number Risk aversion Reserve price Independent private value First-price auction

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275187