How can incentives in unemployment insurance be improved? : theory and evidence
Year of publication: |
2006
|
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Authors: | Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil |
Published in: |
Indicators and policies to make work pay : proceedings of the workshop. - Luxembourg : Office for Official Publ. of the Europ. Communities, ISBN 92-894-9040-3. - 2006, p. 101-119
|
Subject: | Monitoring | Sanctions | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Arbeitsuche | Job search | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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