How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
Maximilian Andres, Lisa Verena Bruttel, Jana Friedrichsen
| Year of publication: |
[2022]
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Bruttel, Lisa Verena ; Andres, Maximillian ; Friedrichsen, Jana |
| Publisher: |
Potsdam : Universität Potsdam |
| Subject: | cartel | collusion | communication | experiment | machine learning | Kartell | Cartel | Kommunikation | Communication | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten; 1115 KB) Tabellen, Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | CEPA discussion papers. - Potsdam : Center for Economic Policy Analysis, University of Potsdam, ISSN 2628-653X, ZDB-ID 2969685-9. - Vol. no. 53 (October 2022) |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. |
| Other identifiers: | 10.25932/publishup-56223 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013447819