How Compatible Are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?
Public choice relies heavily on equilibrium analysis in its models of government failure. Austrians are suspicious of equilibrium analysis owing to its reliance on some variant of the perfect-knowledge assumption. To what extent then can Austrians consistently embrace public-choice descriptions of government failure? This paper argues that to maintain methodological consistency public choice should jettison the equilibrium, perfect-information framework, while keeping the empirically relevant assumption of narrow political interest. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Ikeda, Sanford |
Published in: |
The Review of Austrian Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 16.2003, 1, p. 63-75
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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