How Conservative Does the Central Banker Have to Be? On the Treatment of Expectations under Discretionary Policymaking

This paper explores an issue that arises in the delegation process. The paper shows that a myopic central banker, one who treats expectations as constant in setting discretionary policy, can replicate the behaviour of output and inflation under policy from a timeless perspective. For that to happen, society must delegate a price level target or a speed limit policy to a central banker who is more weight-conservative than society

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Guender, Alfred
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Inflationssteuerung \| Inflation targeting \| Regelbindung versus Diskretion \| Rules versus discretion \| Geldpolitik \| Monetary policy

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (16 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209115