How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
Year of publication: |
2008-10
|
---|---|
Authors: | Brams, Steven J. ; Kilgour, D. Marc |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Democracy | voting | social choice | public goods | game theory | Prisoners' Dilemma | Bible |
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