How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Urpelainen, Johannes |
Published in: |
Environmental economics and policy studies. - Tokyo [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 1432-847X, ZDB-ID 1437708-1. - Vol. 14.2012, 1, p. 23-34
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Subject: | Förderung erneuerbarer Energien | Renewable energy policy | Politiker | Politicians | Grüne Partei | Green party | Politische Entscheidung | Political decision | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Wirtschaftsverband | Business association | Industrie | Manufacturing industries | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wirtschaftswissenschaft | Economics | Theorie | Theory |
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