How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Fehr, Ernst ; Hart, Oliver ; Zehnder, Christian |
Publisher: |
Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics |
Subject: | Verhandlungen | Vertragstheorie | Theorie | contractual reference points | informal agreements | renegotiation | experiment |
Series: | Working Paper ; 43 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.5167/uzh-51547 [DOI] 745825915 [GVK] hdl:10419/77529 [Handle] |
Classification: | C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst, (2011)
-
How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst, (2011)
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst, (2011)
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Contracts as reference points: experimental evidence
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst, (2011)
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Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence
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