How do tax agents respond to anti-corruption intensity?
Chen Ma, Maoyong Cheng, Gerald J. Lobo
We examine whether anti-corruption intensity strengthens tax enforcement effectiveness in China. Using hand-collected anti-corruption data and aggregate tax enforcement data, which include the probability of tax audits and tax deficiencies, for a sample of 11,687 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2017, we find that anti-corruption intensity increases the deterrence role and the enforcement role of tax audits. We also identify the fear effect as a possible channel through which anti-corruption intensity affects tax enforcement effectiveness. Overall, the results indicate that anti-corruption intensity can improve a revenue agency’s effectiveness.
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Ma, Chen ; Cheng, Maoyong ; Lobo, Gerald J. |
Published in: |
Journal of business ethics : JBE. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1573-0697, ZDB-ID 1478688-6. - Vol. 190.2024, 1, p. 137-164
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