This paper addresses how the global activities undertaken by multinational enterprises (MNEs) in international settings impact corporate governance mechanisms and accountability systems. International corporate governance and accountability research, whether from a political science, economics, finance, or accounting perspective, has thus far predominantly focused on the comparison of corporate governance schemes in different countries and on the investigation of institutional parameters that determine these schemes. Straying from this line of inquiry, this article discusses how globalization at the firm level affects governance and accountability systems at parent- and subsidiary-levels. It emphasizes how an MNE's globalization attributes such as globalization scale, foreign adaptation, global competition, and international experience influence the design of governance mechanisms such as board size, board composition, executive compensation, market discipline, interlocking directorate, ownership concentration, duality and inbreeding, as well as the design of accountability systems such as accounting information, auditing standards, and financial and non-financial disclosures. This article bases its conjectures on information processing and agency theories.
