How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Göller, Daniel |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertrag | Contract | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (38 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 14, 2021 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3208561 [DOI] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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