How megaprojects are damaging Nigeria and how to fix it : a practical guide to mastering very large government projects
by Jimoh Ibrahim, Christoph Loch, Kishore Sengupta
1 Introduction: The Project Abandonment Problem -- References -- 2 What We Know About the Management of Very Large Projects -- 2.1 Project Success Factors as Lists -- 2.2 The Project Success Frameworks of Miller and Lessard and Morris and Hough -- 2.2.1 Miller and Lessard (2000) -- 2.2.2 Morris and Hough (1987) -- 2.3 The Nigerian Context -- 2.4 The Extended Theoretical Framework -- 2.5 What About Corruption? -- References -- 3 Structure of the Investigation -- 3.1 Overview of the Approach Taken in This Study -- 3.2 Construction and Execution of the Survey -- 3.3 Construction of the Sample of Projects -- 3.4 Construction of the Case Studies -- Appendix: Full Questionnaire as It Was Administered -- Our Request -- Project Variables -- References -- 4 A Description of the 38 Matched Projects -- 4.1 Lagos-Ibadan Express Road -- 4.2 Lagos-Badagry Express Road -- 4.3 Third Mainland Bridge -- 4.4 Second Niger Bridge -- 4.5 Egbin Power Station -- 4.6 Calabar Power Station -- 4.7 Zungeru Hydropower Plant -- 4.8 Delta State (Oghareki) Power Plant -- 4.9 Shiroro Hydroelectric Power Station -- 4.10 Omoku Power Plant Station -- 4.11 Mambilla Hydroelectric Power -- 4.12 Ajaokuta Steel Project -- 4.13 Kanji Dam -- 4.14 Otukpo Dam -- 4.15 Nigeria Satellite 2 -- 4.16 Nigeria Satellite 1 -- 4.17 Airtel Nigeria -- 4.18 Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) -- 4.19 Godswill Akpabio International Stadium -- 4.20 (Samuel) Ogbemudia Stadium -- 4.21 Abuja International Airport -- 4.22 Lagos MMA2 Airport -- 4.23 Yenagoa International Cargo Airport -- 4.24 Jigawa Airport Project -- 4.25 Tin Can Island Port -- 4.26 Calabar Seaport -- 4.27 Victoria Garden City (VGC) Housing Estate -- 4.28 Festac Town Federal Housing Estate -- 4.29 1004 Housing Estate -- 4.30 Abuja Mass Federal Housing Project -- 4.31 Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library -- 4.32 Abuja National Library -- 4.33 Nigerian Youth Empowerment Scheme (N-Power) -- 4.34 Nigeria Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P) -- 4.35 Lagos State Waste Management Authority (LAWMA) -- 4.36 Cleaner Lagos Initiative (Visionscape) -- 4.37 University College Teaching Hospital (UCH) Ibadan -- 4.38 University of Abuja Teaching Hospital (UATH) -- References -- 5 Insights from the Analysis of the Questionnaires -- 5.1 Variable Distributions and Variable Capability to Detect Differences Across Projects -- 5.1.1 Each Respondent Type Adds Unique Perspectives and Information -- 5.1.2 The Variables Capture Robust Differences Between Abandoned and Completed Projects -- 5.2 Condensing Variables into Aggregated Success Factors -- 5.2.1 Approach -- 5.2.2 Identifying the Factors -- 5.3 Econometric Prediction of Project Completion -- 5.4 Econometric Prediction of Cost and Schedule Overruns for Completed Projects -- 5.4.1 Effect of Variables on Budget Overruns -- 5.4.2 Effect of Variables on Schedule Overruns -- 5.5 The Corrosive Effect of Corruption -- Appendix 1 Correlations Among Independent Variables Across All 114 Responses -- Appendix 2 Factor Analysis -- Appendix 3 Specification of the Logistical Regression -- Appendix 4 The Logistical Completion Probability Regression by Respondent Group -- Appendix 5 Robustness Analysis: Cost Overrun Regressions by Respondent Group -- Appendix 6 Robustness Analysis: Schedule Overrun Regressions by Respondent Group -- 6 Two Library Projects -- 6.1 The National Library of Nigeria in Abuja: An Abandoned Project -- 6.1.1 Project Initiation -- 6.1.2 Contract Signature and Execution -- 6.1.3 Conclusion -- 6.2 Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library: A Completed Project -- 6.2.1 Project Initiation -- 6.2.2 Project Execution and Outcome -- 6.2.3 The Difference Between the Two Projects: In the Words of Former President Obasanjo -- References -- 7 Two Bridge Projects -- 7.1 The Second Niger Bridge: A Stalled Project -- 7.1.1 Project Initiation -- 7.1.2 Contract Disputes and Recontracting -- 7.1.3 Continued Stalling -- 7.1.4 Diagnosis of the Reasons for Failure, in the Words of (Former) President Jonathan -- 7.1.5 Conclusion -- 7.2 The Third Mainland Bridge: A Completed Project -- 7.2.1 Introduction -- 7.2.2 Starting and Stalling -- 7.2.3 Restarting the Project Under President Babangida -- 7.2.4 Project Execution and Outcome -- 7.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 8 Two Power Plants -- 8.1 Egbin Power Station, Ikorodu Lagos State: A Completed Project -- 8.1.1 Initiation and Completion -- 8.1.2 Success Conditions and Challenges -- 8.1.3 Privatization and Trouble -- 8.2 The Calabar Odukpani Power Station: Completed but with Little Delivery -- 8.2.1 Project Initiation -- 8.2.2 Project Complications and Delays -- 8.2.3 Delivery of the Calabar Power Station in 2015 -- 8.2.4 What Has Been Delivered? Lessons from the Project -- References -- 9 Two Express Road Rehabilitation Projects -- 9.1 The Lagos-Ibadan Express Road Rehabilitation: A Completed Project -- 9.1.1 Original Construction of the Express Road -- 9.1.2 A Reconstruction Project in a PPP Scheme -- 9.1.3 Restructuring the Project as a Government-Owned Project -- 9.1.4 Discussion -- 9.2 Lagos-Badagry Express Road Rehabilitation: A Stalled Project -- 9.2.1 Brief History -- 9.2.2 Was the Problem the Fault of the Contractor? -- 9.2.3 Dodgy Funding and Accounting -- 9.2.4 Protest, Additional Funding and Patching Up -- 9.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 10 Two More Power Plants -- 10.1 The Zungeru Dam/Hydropower Plant: A (Soon-to-Be) Completed Project -- 10.1.1 Brief History -- 10.1.2 Enabling Factors of Completion -- 10.2 The Delta State Oghareki Power Plant: An Abandoned Project -- 10.2.1 Initiation -- 10.2.2 The Alleged Corruption -- 10.2.3 Implications -- References -- 11 The Ajaokuta Steel Project -- 11.1 Project Initiation -- 11.2 Project Construction and Cessation by 1988 -- 11.3 The PPP Revival of 2000–2007 -- 11.4 The State of the Asset -- 11.5 Conclusion -- References -- 12 Insights and Recommendations -- 12.1 Summary and Discussion of the Findings -- 12.2 Developing Solutions: Inspiration from Other Countries -- 12.3 Recommendations -- 12.3.1 Recommendations Part 1: Short-Term Changes -- 12.3.2 Recommendations Part 2: Longer-Term Structural Changes -- 13 Conclusion: The Government Responsibility.
