How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Fatás, Enrique ; Neugebauer, Tibor ; Tamborero, Pilar
Institutions:	Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia
Subject:	Subject-pool effect \| experts \| expected utility \| prospect theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number E2004/58 22 pages
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063155