How powerful CEOs adopt antitakeover provisions?
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Lee, Eunsuh ; Kim, Chaehyun ; Lee, Junyoup |
Published in: |
Applied economics letters. - New York, NY : Routledge, ISSN 1466-4291, ZDB-ID 1484783-8. - Vol. 29.2022, 10, p. 910-914
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Subject: | Antitakeover provisions | CEO power | Managerial entrenchment hypothesis | Quiet life hypothesis | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Übernahme | Takeover | Macht | Power | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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