How Proper is the Dominance-Solvable Outcome?

We prove that any normal-form game that is dominance solvable by weak dominance and that satisfies the transference of decision-maker indifference condition (TDI* of Marx and Swinkels [1997]) has a finite number of equilibrium outcomes. This implies that the unique outcome of dominance solvability in these games must coincide with the payoff of a proper equilibrium. We then apply our theorems to both generic outcome-form games and voting games

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Koriyama, Yukio
Other Persons:	Nuñez, Matias (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 14, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2630596 [DOI]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019396